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Italy	under	the	spotlight	of	another	financial	crisis
Ten	years	since	Lehman	and	the	financial	crisis,	the	main	questions	on	the	table	are	whether	the	world	has	learned
the	lessons	and	what	could	be	the	source	of	the	next	financial	crisis.	The	risk	of	a	new	recession	in	Europe,	the	end
of	Quantitative	Easing	by	the	ECB,	and	the	spread	of	populism	and	Euroscepticism	has	put	Italy	back	in	the	spotlight.
The	Eurozone’s	third-largest	economy	is	in	a	fragile	position	compared	to	other	peripheral	countries	such	as	Spain,
Portugal	and	Greece,	which	have	largely	recovered	since	the	outbreak	of	the	sovereign	debt	crisis.	The	sentiment	is
still	feeble,	economic	growth	is	at	the	lower	end	of	the	range	of	EU	countries	and	government	bond	yields	have	risen
since	March,	when	the	elections	resulted	in	a	new	government	led	by	the	populist	Five	Stars	Movement	and	the
League.	The	transmission	channel	of	a	possible	new	crisis	is	still	the	banking	sector	because	of	the	sovereign-bank
link,	which	has	effectively	remained	in	place	since	the	last	crisis.
How	did	it	all	start?
The	Eurozone	government	debt	crisis	started	in	2010	and	with	that	the	problems	of	Italian	banks.	It	was	the	delayed
unfolding	of	the	global	financial	crisis	hitting	peripheral	Europe.	It	touched	specific	weaknesses	of	the	individual
countries	and	the	vulnerabilities	of	an	unfinished	European	project.	With	poor	economic	performance	in	the	years
preceding	the	crisis	and	a	very	high	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	Italy	quickly	became	the	focus	of	the	financial	markets’
attention	and	a	threat	for	the	stability	of	the	whole	Eurozone,	given	the	size	of	its	economy	and	public	debt.	Investors
started	to	question	Italy’s	ability	to	repay	its	public	debt.	They	sold	government	bonds,	and	yields	moved	higher
threatening	to	confirm	the	fears	and	make	the	crisis	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy.
Compared	to	other	European	countries,	Italy	did	not	experience	a	collapse	in	real	estate	prices	as	in	Spain,	a
banking	bailout	as	in	Ireland,	or	an	unreported	rise	in	the	deficit	as	in	Greece.	Before	2007,	Italian	banks	were	mostly
focused	on	their	domestic	market,	with	80%	of	their	activities	in	Italy	and	moderate	exposure	to	international	markets.
In	2007-2008,	the	spread	of	financial	instability	from	the	United	States	undermined	the	soundness	of	the	European
banking	sector,	but	Italian	banks	were	only	indirectly	affected,	sheltered	by	a	business	model	that	was	mainly
focused	on	traditional	commercial	banking	activities.	At	the	peak	of	the	crisis	in	2011,	there	were	worries	about	the
sustainability	of	Italy’s	public	debt,	but	there	were	no	serious	concerns	about	the	financial	stability	of	the	banking
sectors.
Figure	1:	Bank	holdings	of	general	government	securities
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Nevertheless,	some	banks,	especially	those	with	operations	across	Europe,	already	in	a	weak	position	or	financially
overexposed,	started	to	have	some	difficulties.	However,	the	most	severe	impact	came	from	the	banks’	role	as
lenders	to	the	government	via	bond	purchases.	They	had	one	of	the	highest	exposures	among	the	major	European
countries	(Figure	1).
The	stock	of	government	bonds	in	the	portfolios	of	Italian	banks	moved	from	182.9	billion	euros	at	the	end	of	2007	to
a	peak	of	463.9	billion	in	May	2015,	according	to	ECB	data.	They	increased	again	to	another	peak	of	472.1	billion	in
June	2016.	Then	there	was	a	slow	decline	in	the	stock,	settling	at	379.5	billion	in	December	2017.	In	2018,	the	stock
increased	again	and	reached	435.5	billion	in	July.	These	figures	include	all	the	government	securities	held	in	the
portfolios	of	Italian	banks,	but	the	doom-loop	of	the	sovereign-bank	link	is	more	specifically	related	to	the	position
held	in	Italian	government	securities.	According	to	Bank	of	Italy	data,	this	latter	stock	moved	from	160.0	billion	in
December	2007	to	a	peak	of	426.3	in	June	2013.	It	declined	to	333.5	billion	at	the	end	of	2017	and	was	387.5	billion
in	June	2018.	Part	of	that	is	related	to	the	banks’	decision	to	reduce	loans	in	favour	of	perceived-safer	government
bonds	during	the	economic	crisis,	part	is	due	to	the	financing	operations	of	the	ECB,	which	required	a	sizeable
amount	of	collateral.	Still,	as	of	today,	the	doom	loop	is	very	big	and	very	much	alive.
When	the	crisis	unfolded,	and	government	bond	spreads	widened,	banks	also	suffered	from	a	de-facto	closure	of	the
Eurozone	interbank	market	and	the	related	difficulties	in	funding	their	financing	gap.	Then,	all	this	weighed	on	the
stability	of	the	Italian	banking	sector	and	some	of	these	problems	are	still	present	today.
A	massive	shock	on	GDP	and	bank	lending
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In	the	first	wave	of	the	crisis,	with	the	outbreak	of	the	Lehman	Brothers’	case	in	2008,	Italian	banks	adopted	a	very
conservative	credit	policy,	increasing	their	portfolios	of	liquid	assets	with	the	lowest	risk	(i.e.	investing	more	in
government	bonds),	and	reducing	their	exposure	to	clients	with	low	ratings	and	their	overall	lending.	The	perceived
higher	lending	risk	translated	into	higher	spreads	versus	money	market	rates	and	prompted	banks	to	ask	their	clients
for	increased	guarantees	and	collaterals.	The	reduced	supply	of	credit	and	the	higher	perceived	risk	increased	the
cost	for	borrowers,	especially	for	small	and	medium-size	enterprises.
In	2011-2012,	the	situation	precipitated.	The	Italian	economy	experienced	a	quasi-credit	crunch	mainly	caused	by	a
supply-side	shock	in	bank	lending:	credit	was	sharply	reduced	as	a	reaction	to	liquidity	problems	and	a	risk-averse
attitude.	The	quasi-credit	crunch	(Figure	2)	inevitably	contributed	to	the	massive	contraction	in	the	economy.
Figure	2:	Bank	loads	to	Italian	residents
The	dominant	role	of	banks	in	financing	the	Italian	economy	and	the	relatively	underdeveloped	capital	market	(bond
and	equity)	contributed	to	amplifying	the	credit	problems	during	the	crisis.	The	curbing	of	bank	credit	forced
companies	to	scale	back	their	investment	plans	and	households	to	reduce	consumption,	increasing	and	extending
the	adverse	effect	of	the	shocks	to	the	real	economy.
Government	intervention	and	firefighting
Addressing	banking	problems	in	earnest	was	a	plus	for	the	European	Union	countries	that	did	it.	The	first	massive
intervention	occured	right	after	the	US-induced	shock	in	the	financial	markets	following	the	sub-prime	crisis.	Except
for	contingent	liabilities,	interventions	consisted	of	deficit	and	debt	increasing.	Impaired	assets	resulted	in	substantial
capital	needs	to	address	the	losses,	and	capital	was	raised	more	or	less	swiftly	in	2008-2009	and	affected	mainly
Germany,	the	UK,	Ireland,	Belgium,	the	Netherlands,	Denmark,	Luxembourg,	Austria	and	to	a	lesser	extent	France.
Government	intervention	to	support	the	banking	sector	in	the	initial	stage	of	the	crisis	was	indeed	massive,	but	early
intervention	seems	to	have	slightly	reduced	the	negative	economic	impact	of	the	crisis	and	allowed	a	quicker
recovery	in	credit.
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The	second	wave	of	banking	problems	started	with	the	Greek	crisis	and	affected	state	aid,	deficits	and	debt,	mostly
from	2011	onwards.	Government	intervention	was	much	smaller	in	absolute	terms,	but	sizeable	if	considered	in
relation	to	the	GDP	of	the	countries	affected.	Deteriorating	public	finances	and	a	negative	feedback	loop	between
sovereigns	and	the	banks	severely	constrained	any	possible	intervention.	In	parallel,	European	leaders	said	“never
again”	and	decided	to	try	to	break	this	link.	This	aim	led	to	the	re-introduction	of	state	aid	rules	in	the	summer	of	2013
and	then	of	the	Bank	Resolution	and	Restructuring	Directive	(BRRD),	which	became	effective	in	January	2016.
Since	then,	the	attitude	has	changed,	and	the	European	framework	has	developed	in	the	direction	of	shifting	the
burden	of	any	future	crisis	toward	investors	and	depositors.	The	possibility	of	government	intervention	has	become
much	more	constrained.
In	Italy,	policymakers	and	banks	did	not	recognise	promptly	enough	the	fast	deterioration	in	non-performing	loans
(NPLs),	as	well	as	their	effect	on	lending	and	the	broader	economy.	Moreover,	the	high	debt-to-GDP	ratio	limited
government	intervention.	As	a	result,	the	situation	continued	to	deteriorate	until	2016.	At	the	end	of	2016,	the	Italian
government	allotted	20	billion	euros	to	set	up	a	fund	for	intervention	to	help	banks	through	various	instruments.	De
facto,	this	injection	of	public	funds	addressed	the	leftovers	of	the	crisis	and	the	lagged	impact	on	NPLs.
In	the	meantime,	the	economy	improved	and	banks	worked	more	diligently	on	their	NPL	positions.	Banking	problems
in	Italy	required	substantially	less	public	money	than	in	other	countries,	but	the	smaller	and	delayed	intervention
came	at	a	price.
Why	was	Italy	special?
The	critical	aspect	of	the	Italian	banking	crisis	is	the	exposure	of	retail	investors	to	junior	and	senior	bank	bonds.
Italian	savers	held	about	29	billion	euros	in	subordinated	bank	bonds	as	of	the	third	quarter	of	2015,	i.e.	before	the
BRRD	came	into	effect.	Italian	households	held	more	than	70%	of	the	total	stock	of	outstanding	bank	bonds	in	1998,
a	percentage	that	declined	to	21.2%	in	the	third	quarter	of	2017.	Households’	holdings	of	bank	bonds	reached	a	peak
as	a	percentage	of	their	total	financial	assets	(10.8%)	and	their	total	debt	securities	(56.7%)	in	the	third	quarter	of
2011	(Figure	3).
Selling	junior	bonds	to	retail	investors	was	a	way	for	Italian	banks	to	access	cheap	funding	during	the	financial	crisis.
Between	July	2007	and	June	2009,	80%	of	Italian	bank	bonds	were	sold	to	retail	investors.	Many	investors	may	not
have	fully	understood	the	risks	they	were	taking.	Banks	benefitted	from	the	information	asymmetry	relative	to	their
clients	by	placing	risky	bonds	at	relatively	low	yields.
With	the	introduction	of	the	BRRD,	Italian	retail	investors	suddenly	discovered	they	were	exposed	to	very	risky
assets,	in	the	absence	of	an	adequately	extended	transition	period	or	grandfathering,	i.e.	exemption	from	the	new
regulation	for	outstanding	bonds.	The	fundamental	idea	of	shifting	the	burden	of	bank	restructuring	and	resolution
from	the	government	to	private	investors	was	correct,	but	the	lack	of	a	sufficiently	large	pool	of	bail-in-able	bonds
beyond	those	held	by	retail	investors	made	Italy	an	exceptional	case	in	the	European	context.	With	hindsight,	the
transition	toward	the	BRRD	should	have	been	more	gradual,	or	at	least	it	should	have	taken	into	account	the
specificities	of	Italian	retail	investors’	exposure	to	banks,	i.e.	there	should	have	been	some	form	of	grandfathering.
Figure	3:	Households’	exposure	to	bank	bonds
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Figure	4:	Bad	debt,	gross	and	net	of	provisioning
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The	weakness	of	some	governance	models
The	three	major	groups	of	banks,	characterised	by	three	different	governance	structures,	reacted	to	the	crisis	in
different	ways.	Cooperative	banks	(banche	popolari),	representing	the	second	largest	group	in	terms	of	number	of
employees	and	branches	after	the	commercial	ones	(9.4%	of	total	loans	in	December	2017),	increased	both
branches	and	employees	despite	the	rise	in	their	NPLs,	thereby	putting	pressure	on	costs	and	profitability.	The	same
phenomenon,	on	an	even	bigger	scale,	affected	the	mutual	banks	(banche	di	credito	cooperativo;	6.6%	of	total
loans).
Mutual	banks	grant	credit	primarily	to	their	members,	reflecting	their	mutualistic	nature	and	the	regulatory	restrictions
on	geographical	expansion.	Their	shares	are	non-tradable:	they	do	not	reflect	the	value	of	the	company,	as	profits
are	mostly	allocated	to	a	reserve	fund.	Cooperative	banks’	shares	are	instead	listed	on	the	stock	exchange	and	only
10%	of	their	profits	have	to	be	paid	to	the	reserves.	In	both	cases,	non-members	can	hold	shares	and	they	can	enjoy
property	rights	attached	to	the	shares,	but	they	cannot	vote	or	exert	rights	of	control.	The	voting	rule	is	one	member-
one	vote.	In	both	cases,	ownership	rights	are	limited	and	institutional	investors	may	hold	only	up	to	10%	of	the
capital.	New	membership	applications	have	to	be	approved	by	the	board.	This	governance	structure	impinged	on	the
ability	of	banks	to	respond	effectively	to	a	crisis,	especially	by	hampering	their	capital-raising	potential	at	a	time	of
distress,	not	providing	adequate	incentives	to	control	banks’	management	and	complicating	the	bank	resolution
process.
In	the	early	years	of	the	financial	crisis	(2008-2009),	cooperative	banks	gave	continuity	to	the	loan	supply	thanks	to
their	financial	strength	and	funding	stability,	although,	by	the	second	half	of	2011,	they	suffered	from	a	liquidity	shock.
In	October	2011,	the	net	interbank	position	of	the	cooperative	sector	was	negative	for	the	first	time.	Cooperative
banks	also	experienced	a	sharp	deterioration	in	credit	quality.
The	reforms	of	cooperative	banks	launched	in	January	2015	by	the	Italian	government	addressed	most	of	the
governance	issues.	In	March	2015,	the	government	approved	a	law	that	provided	strong	incentives	for	the	ten	largest
cooperative	banks	to	transform	themselves	into	joint	stock	companies.	The	merger	between	Banca	Popolare	di
Milano	and	Banco	Popolare,	which	created	Italy’s	third-largest	domestic	bank,	is	a	direct	consequence	of	the	reform.
In	February	2016,	the	cabinet	of	ministers	approved	the	reform	of	the	mutual	banks.	The	reform	permitted	the
establishment	of	parent	companies,	with	the	controlling	majority	owned	by	the	cooperative	banks	themselves.	Mutual
banks	had	to	either	adhere	to	a	parent	company	group	or	transform	themselves	into	joint	stock	companies.	The
parent	company	manages	strategic	coordination,	supervision,	and	risk	management,	as	well	as	the	raising	of	funds
in	financial	markets	for	the	whole	group.	The	reform	aims	at	strengthening	the	Italian	mutual	banking	sector,
improving	access	to	capital	market	funding	and	enhancing	the	governance	profile.	Since	then,	three	groups	have
developed,	and	the	implementation	of	the	reform	is	underway.
Consolidation	helps	correct	overcapacity	in	the	banking	sector,	and	the	creation	of	larger	entities	allows	for	greater
economies	of	scale,	all	of	which	helps	efficiency	and	profitability,	although	severance	payments	due	to	cuts	in
personnel	depress	profitability	in	the	near	term.	Finally,	this	new	governance	helps	to	improve	the	allocation	of
resources	within	the	economy.
The	role	of	banking	foundations	has	also	changed	during	the	crisis.	Eighty-eight	banking	foundations	used	to	hold	a
significant	equity	share	of	the	banking	sector,	with	the	first	two	accounting	for	one-third	of	the	total	foundations’
holdings.	These	foundations	appeared	during	the	1990s	when	Italy	started	a	process	that	transformed	state-owned
banks	into	public	companies.
Banking	foundations	used	to	exert	some	influence	on	the	major	decisions	made	by	banks	through	their	role	as
reference	shareholders	with	representation	on	the	boards	of	directors.	Politicians	in	municipalities,	provinces	and
regions	typically	appointed	the	advisors	and	managers	of	foundations	and	thus	they	exerted	a	considerable	influence
on	the	major	decisions.	As	a	result,	politicians	indirectly	controlled	banks	as	they	appointed	board	members	of
foundations,	who	in	turn	sit	on	the	boards	of	the	banks.
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The	capitalisation	of	Italian	banks	was	among	the	lowest	in	Europe	before	the	crisis.	The	preference	of	banking
foundations	for	a	stable	stream	of	dividends	to	finance	social	projects	reduced	financial	flexibility	and	the	ability	of
banks	to	recapitalise	themselves	through	internal	cash	flows	during	the	crisis.	This	phenomenon	put	banks	under
pressure	at	a	time	when	European	rules	forced	them	to	increase	capital;	foundations	were	not	in	a	position	to	provide
it.	Most	of	the	foundations’	revenue	streams	came	from	dividends	paid	by	banks,	and	foundations	mostly	used	to
invest	rather	than	save	these	streams.	Furthermore,	the	presence	of	foundations	and	the	nature	of	the	interests	they
represent	might	have	discouraged	the	arrival	of	private	investors	with	fresh	capital.	In	other	words,	their	interests
were	not	fully	aligned	with	those	of	investors	willing	to	maximise	shareholders’	value	over	the	long	term,	but	rather
concentrated	on	the	objective	of	preserving	the	stream	of	dividends	and	possibly	exerting	power	in	the	allocation	of
resources	locally.
In	April	2015,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	ACRI,	the	Association	of	Italian	Savings	Banks	and	Foundations,	signed	a
Memorandum	of	Understanding	forbidding	foundations	from	investing	more	than	33%	of	their	equity	in	any	single
asset	class.	Also,	new	European	rules	imposed	that	part	of	banking	capital	was	to	be	used	as	reserves	in	case	of
crisis,	and	this	inevitably	reduced	the	payout	ratio.	In	2008,	just	before	the	financial	crisis,	foundations	received	2.3
billion	euros	as	dividends	from	banks,	i.e.	the	highest	payout	ratio	since	2000.	In	2015,	this	amount	declined	to	394
million	euros.	In	the	meantime,	foundations	reduced	their	stakes	in	Italian	banks	substantially,	mostly	because	of
capital	dilution.	The	ratio	of	dividends	paid	to	foundations	in	total	moved	from	15.7%	in	2008	to	2.9%	in	2015.	By
now,	the	role	of	foundations	in	the	Italian	banking	sector	is	far	smaller.
Figure	5:	Number	of	branches	by	type	of	banks
Figure	6:	Number	of	employees	by	type	of	banks
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The	rise	of	NPLs	and	related	policy	measures
The	share	of	NPLs	over	total	loans	was	low	before	the	financial	crisis	and	below	3%	in	2006-2008.	The	quality	of
lending	began	to	worsen	in	2009,	and	then	deteriorated	each	year	through	2016,	and	especially	after	the	sovereign
debt	crisis	that	started	in	2011,	in	step	with	the	contraction	of	the	Italian	economy.	Several	factors	contributed	to	a
rising	NPL	stock:	over-indebted	corporates	following	the	sharp	crisis-related	drop	in	output,	a	highly	complex	legal
system	of	corporate	restructuring	and	insolvency,	lengthy	judicial	procedures,	and	a	tax	system	that	until	recently
discouraged	NPL	write-offs.
The	decrease	in	bad	debt	net	inflows	(down	from	24.7	billion	in	2015	to	10.8	billion	in	2016	and	-19.6	billion	in	2017)
is	mainly	related	to	the	recovery	of	the	economy	and	NPL	internal	management	by	banks.	Securitisation	and	sales	of
NPLs	increased	from	7.1	billion	in	2015	to	17.9	billion	in	2016	and	38.7	billion	in	2017.	The	combined	effect	of	these
flows	has	allowed	for	a	reduction	in	the	stock	of	NPLs.	In	December	2015,	they	were	200.7	billion.	They	stayed
broadly	unchanged	at	200.9	billion	at	the	end	of	2016,	but	they	declined	to	167.4	billion	at	the	end	of	2017	and	to
127.5	billion	in	July	2018.	Despite	the	pace	of	write-offs	having	increased	significantly	and	despite	the	fact	that	loan
loss	provisions	cover	more	than	half	of	the	total	amount,	the	stock	of	NPLs	as	a	percentage	of	total	loans	remains
high	(see	Figure	4).
NPLs	had	an	adverse	feedback	effect	on	the	macroeconomic	environment	through	their	impact	on	the	lending
capacity	of	banks.	The	supply	of	credit	was	affected	as	banks	locked	in	capital	and	funding	in	the	financing	of	non-
productive	assets.	This	phenomenon	reduced	the	balance	sheet	room	available	for	new	lending.	Furthermore,	NPLs
reduced	the	profitability	of	banks,	which	over	time	weighed	additionally	on	the	loan	supply	through	higher	funding
costs	and	increased	credit	constraints.
The	low	market	value	of	Italian	loans	stems	mainly	from	the	lengthy	period	required	to	repossess	collateral,	which	in
some	cases	can	take	several	years,	buyers’	more	cautious	collateral	valuations	and	higher	investors’	return	hurdles.
Italian	authorities	have	implemented	new	measures	aimed	at	improving	the	efficiency	and	speed	of	judicial	and
extrajudicial	insolvency	procedures	to	facilitate	the	reduction	of	bad	loans	on	the	balance	sheets	of	banks.	Moreover,
in	April	2016	the	Italian	government	introduced	further	amendments	to	the	insolvency	and	foreclosure	framework
aimed	at	reducing	the	time	necessary	for	recovering	collateral.	In	particular,	it	launched	a	digital	register	on	judicial
property	foreclosures	and	insolvency	proceedings	that	improves	the	availability	of	information	for	the	valuation	of
NPLs.
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The	development	of	a	secondary	market	for	NPLs	should	help	banks	to	continue	moving	bad	loans	off	their	balance
sheets	and	improve	the	loan	recovery	values	by	providing	a	more	cost-effective	alternative	to	internal	NPL
management,	especially	for	smaller	banks	or	banks	with	scattered	loan	portfolios.	Government	measures	to	speed
up	foreclosures	were	positive	but	only	affected	new	or	renegotiated	loans	rather	than	materially	reducing	the	existing
stock	of	bad	loans.
Conclusions
To	sum	up,	Italian	banks’	profitability	and	capital	adequacy	have	been	under	pressure	since	the	start	of	the	crisis.
Banks	have	initially	responded	to	a	lack	of	funding	via	capital	increases	to	refinance	NPLs,	trying	to	avoid	or	delay
loss	recognition	or	sale,	and	the	related	squeeze	in	their	profit	margins.	Only	under	the	pressure	of	European
authorities	in	2015	did	Italian	banks	start	to	unveil	the	full	extent	of	the	NPL	problem.
A	bird’s-eye	view	of	Italian	banking	problems	shows	that	most	of	them	were	direct	consequences	of	the	government
debt	crisis,	the	supply-side	credit	crunch	that	followed,	and	the	downturn	in	the	economy.	A	negative	loop	further
depressed	the	performance	of	the	economy	and,	in	turn,	affected	the	quality	of	banks’	credit	portfolios.	The	timing
and	the	characteristics	of	the	BRRD	introduction	exacerbated	the	difficulties	in	addressing	the	issues	via	government
intervention.	Moreover,	the	governance	of	cooperative	and	mutual	banks,	and	the	role	of	banking	foundations,	also
contributed	to	the	banks’	sub-optimal	response	to	the	crisis.	Currently,	most	reforms	are	in	place	and,	among	other
benefits,	they	favour	a	reduction	in	the	stock	of	NPLs.	So	far,	however,	the	reduction	remains	somewhat	short	of	the
desired	pace.	The	next	recession	may	arise	even	before	Italy	adequately	addresses	its	remaining	vulnerabilities.
♣♣♣
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